CREATIVE NORM DESTRUCTION: THE EVOLUTION
OF NONLEGAL RULES IN JAPANESE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CURTISJ. MILHAUPT
This Article analyzes the origins,persistence, and current evolution of a series
of nonlegal rules (norms) that have played an important role in Japanesecorporate governance. The centralfeatures of the governance environment examined
here include: (1) the main bank system, in which banks voluntarily restructure
loans to some distressed borrowers, (2) a social distaste for hostile takeovers, (3)
implicit promises of employment stability, and (4) belief systems about the proper
role andstructure of the boardof directors.
I show that, despite virtually ubiquitous claims to the contrary, these norms do
not enjoy a long history of practice in Japan,but ratheremerged only in the immediate postwar period. I hypothesize that they emergedfor two reasons: First, they
seined as a low-cost substitutefor a troubledformal institutionalenvironment beset by the "transplanteffect" that imperils legal reform in transitioneconomies today. Second, they providedprivate benefits to the small number of interest groups
that emerged intactfrom World War ff. The flow of private benefits to norm adherents explains the persistence of the norms despite clear evidence of their inefficiency over the past decade.
I demonstrate that current models of norm reform, which emphasize the role of
exogenous shocks, the workings of norm entrepreneurs, and increasedinformation,
explain why the norms ofJapanesecorporategovernance are currently evolving.
Finally, extrapolatingfrom Japan's experience, I suggest how norm analysis
can contribute to the two most pressing questions in comparative corporate gov.rnance today: whether law matters to corporate governance and whether diverse
Aystems of corporategovernance are convergingtoward the Anglo-American model.
As to both questions, closer attention to norms reveals shortcomingsin the existing
literature. Specifically, the empiricalmodel underlyingthe "law matters" literature
is shown to be inconsistent with historicalexperience and overly attentive to formal

t Fuyo Professor of Law and Director, Center for Japanese Legal Studies, Columbia Law School. This Article grew out of a series of interviews I held in Tokyo with approximately twenty-five government officials, lawyers, investment bankers, and corporate managers in June of 2000. Since several interviewees requested anonymity, I have
cited to my interview transcripts without disclosing the identity of the interviewee. Interested (or skeptical) readers may review redacted transcripts upon request. I owe my
interviewees a large debt of gratitude. Prior drafts were improved by comments from
Robert Ellickson, Koichi Hamada, Michiyo Hamada, Hugh Patrick, Gary Saxonhouse,
Mark West, my symposium commentator Reinier Kraakman, and symposium or workshop participants at Columbia University, University of Michigan, University of Pennsylania, and Vanderbilt University Law Schools, and the American Law and Economic% Association Annual Meeting. I also benefited from discussions with Melvin
Eisenberg.

(2083)

2084

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW

[Vol. 149:2083

rules enforced by courts. Bold claims that we are witnessing rapid convergence toward a shareholder-centeredideology, which in turn will drive convergence of corporate law and practices,are only partiallysupported by theJapaneseexperience to
date. Rather than the "endof history"for corporate law, we are witnessing an ongoing struggle to align the formal and informal components of the governance regimes of many transitioneconomies, includingJapan's.
INTRODUCTION

As this Symposium attests, the role of norms in the corporation
has only recently attracted the attention of legal scholars.' This is curious, given the depth of analysis previously devoted to the role social
norms play in governing collective behavior among cattle ranchers,
diamond merchants, sumo wrestlers, and other exotica.2 The importance, if not the novelty, of these well-studied groups pales in comparison to the corporation, arguably the most ingenious private organization ever devised.
Perhaps even more curiously, social norms have been virtually ignored in the comparative corporate governance debates of the past
decade. The omission of norms from this body of literature is particularly stark. It is now widely recognized, for example, that legal protections for minority investors are a key variable in determining patterns
of corporate ownership and finance around the world. Yet the literature to date (which ironically has been dominated by economists) displays a rather naive fixation on formal legal protections and judicial
enforcement to the exclusion of other alternatives. To take another
example, analysis of complements and substitutes has been used powerfully to explain major phenomena in comparative corporate law, including the stickiness of institutional change and the unintended consequences of legal transplants. But this conceptual framework has not
been brought to bear on the interaction between legal and nonlegal
rules in the governance of firms. Perhaps most glaringly, for all the
recent discussion of global convergence on a shareholder-centered
model of corporate governance, there have been remarkably few careful examinations of the linkage between corporate norm shifts and
1 Two noteworthy exceptions are Melvin A. Eisenberg, CorporateLaw and Social
Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999), and Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How
Does Delaware CorporateLaw Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997).
2 ROBERT C. ELLiCKsON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw:
HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991) (cattle ranchers); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (diamond merchants); Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan'sSecret World of
Sumo, 26J. LEGALSTUD. 165 (1997) (sumo wrestlers).
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changes in corporate law and practice.
As a modest step toward filling these gaps in the literature, in this
Article I examine the creation, persistence, and evolution of a series of
highly complementary, nonlegally enforceable practices that shaped
postwar corporate govemance for large Japanese firms. I examine
four central features of the governance emironment: (1) the "main
bank" system and its role in corporate monitoring, (2) the absence of
an external market for corporate control, (3) the structure and role of
Japanese boards, and (4) the lifetime employment system. Examining
these components of Japanese corporate governance is certainly not
novel. Analyzing them as norms, however, yields some fresh insights
into how nonlegal rules interacted with the legal system during the
heyday ofJapanese corporate governance, why the norm-based system
persisted long after evidence of its inefficiency emerged, and how (or
whether) Japan is currently adapting to a shareholder-centered ideology of corporate governance. Most interestingly, Japan's experience
with corporate norms-which as we shall see is intimately related to its
three experiences as a transition economy--sheds light on a current
debate about the role of law in corporate governance. This debate is
itself an outgrowth of the past decade of institutional disarray in many
transition economies of Eastern Europe and Asia.
This Article has two principal aims: First, to contribute to the limited store of primary research on norms by analyzing their role in the
governance of firms in the world's second largest economy. Primary
research on norms of all types is in short supply, but research on the
operation of norms among organizations is virtually nonexistent. 3
The second aim is to draw attention to the lack of norm analysis in
comparative corporate governance scholarship. The Article does so
by illustrating, based on the Japanese experience, how norm analysis
contributes to the two most interesting questions in comparative corporate governance today: Do legal differences explain cross-country
differences in corporate ownership and finance, and are corporate
governance systems converging?
The Article is organized as follows: Part I describes four norms
that are intimately connected to Japanese corporate governance practices in the postwar period. Part II demonstrates, despite numerous
claims to the contrary, that each of these norms first emerged in the

J The sole exception may be an article prepared for this Symposium. Robert
Cooter & Mehin A. Eisenberg, Good Agent Character,Fairness,and Efficiency in Firms, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1717 (2001).
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postwar period and represents a break with past practices. This insight provides important clues about the origins and durability of the
norm-based system. I hypothesize that the new norms emerged as
both low-cost substitutes for legal rules in the institutional turmoil of
the immediate postwar period and as a fount of private benefits for
the few organized groups left intact after the war and Allied occupation. Normative corporate governance, I argue, was a postwar Japanese invention understandable through the lenses of transaction cost
economics and public choice theory. Part III explores the ongoing
evolution of the postwar norms of Japanese corporate governance, reflecting shifts in the relative costs of using legal versus nonlegal rules,
reconfigurations of the players in Japanese corporate governance, increased information, and the workings of norm reformers, including
those within the government. Drawing on the creation and destruction of nonlegal rules in corporate Japan, Part IV highlights the contribution of norm analysis to the two key debates in comparative corporate law scholarship today.
Before proceeding, a definition and two caveats are in order. One
of the principal problems with norm analysis is the lack of agreement
on the definition of the term. In this Article, I have adopted Richard
Posner's definition: a norm is "a rule that is not promulgated by an
official source, such as a court or a legislature, nor enforced by the
threat of legal sanctions, yet is regularly complied with."4 This definition does not require that a rule be internalized as a preference' or
that it be deeply rooted in the culture that complies with it. Unlike
many other definitions in use, it does not place particular emphasis
on social enforcement, thus highlighting the possibility that norms
can be self-enforcing if compliance generates private benefits. The
first caveat is that, for reasons made clear below, several of the rules I
am about to discuss fall marginally outside that definition because
they depend in some way on the government for promulgation or enforcement. I have included them because their informal character
substantially outweighs the support they draw from the state and because the intermeshing of norms and state-generated rules is one of
the key themes emerging from our inquiry. The second caveat is that
these norms apply only to the governance of large, publicly held firms.

4 Richard A. Posner, SocialNorms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON.
REV., PAPERS AND PROCS. OF THE HUNDRED AND NINTH ANN. MEETING OF THE AM.

ASS'N, May 1997, at 365, 365.
ECON.
rId.
at 365 n.1.
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FOUR NONLEGAL RULES OFJAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The stylized account of Japanese corporate governance for large
firms contains several key features: the "main bank" system, in which
banks are said to perform the key monitoring role over their client
firms; the concomitant absence of an external market for corporate
control; employee-dominated boards that focus on day-to-day management rather than monitoring; and the lifetime employment system, in which certain employees enjoy implicit promises of careerlong job stability. This Part examines the normative features of these
arrangements. My point here is not that law is irrelevant to Japanese
corporate governance.5 Rather, it is to highlight the distinction between institutions (endogenously generated, self-enforcing informal
rules, including beliefs) and law, 7 and to show how important the
former are to the Japanese firm.
A. Norms Governing the Main Bank System
Perhaps the principal distinguishing feature ofJapanese corporate
governance is the main bank system. The main bank, at least as it operated in its heyday, can be characterized as the largest single lender
to a corporate client as well as one of its principal shareholders. As a
central repository of information on the borrower, the main bank was
well positioned to play a key role in monitoring the firm's management and rendering assistance in case of managerial crisis or financial
failure." This assistance could include loan forgiveness and guarantees of outstanding and new indebtedness.
The main bank is not a legal institution. Its function is not del I have argued elsewhere that the formal legal structure in Japan supports corporate private ordering in crucial ways. CurtisJ. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory ofJapanese
corporate Governance: Contract, Culture, and the Rule of Laug 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 3 (1996);
we a&o J. MARK R-AVMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAw: AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH 2-3 (1999) (arguing that the Japanese legal system provides proper incentives for economic growth).
I am following the lead of Stanford economist Masahiko Aoki in drawing this
distinction. Aoki focuses exclusively on the main bank system. See Masahiko Aoki, A
Note on the Role of Banking in Developing Economies in the Aftermath of the East
Asian Crisis (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
I make no claims here about the quality or economic effects of main bank monitoring. Those questions are currently being reassessed in light of Japan's economic
malaise. See, e.g., Christopher W. Anderson & Terry Campbell II, Corporate Govern-

ance ofJapanese Banks 30 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Social Science
Research Network), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?cfid=
428604&cftoken--85393283&abstractid=231950.
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fined in any statute or regulation. Nor are any special obligations to
borrowers specified contractually." Rather, the main bank system rests
on a social presumption. A "prominent part of the business ideology
surrounding the main bank system""' is the expectation on the part of
the bank, the borrower, and all relevant business and governmental
actors that a main bank informally restructures a large failing company rather than foreclosing on its loans. In these informal workout
scenarios, the main bank typically waives a portion of the debt in return for a restructuring plan by the borrower." Although the main
bank almost always has a first priority security interest in the collateral
of the debtor, the bank, in effect, voluntarily subordinates its interest
to that of the other lenders.
Why does the main bank undertake this role? This question is the
subject of a vast literature that I will not summarize here. The key for
present purposes is that, as Geoffrey Miller and I have argued elsewhere, the entire main bank system is supported by a cluster of norms
that encourage banks to support weak firms (at least those for which a
return to solvency and profitability are possible) in return for a nonlegally enforceable promise by the government to prevent bank failure.' 2 Indeed, until the early 1990s, there was not a single Japanese
q See Aoki, supra note 7; see alsoJ. Mark Ramseyer, Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The Legal Logic to the Japanese Main Bank System, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK
SYSTEM:

ITS RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORUMING ECONOMIEs 231, 231

(Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994) (describing the main bank system as a
"nexus of implied contracts" or "promises... never made").
10Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and CorporateMonitoring and Controlin Japan,
lIJ. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 399, 407 (1989).
1 See Phred Dvorak, Japan Readies New Remedy on Bank Debt, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5,
2001, at A14 (reporting that 235 companies received informal debt waivers from 1985
to Avril 2000).
CurtisJ. Milhaupt & Geoffrey P. Miller, Cooperation, Conflict, and Convergence in
JapaneseFinance: Evidencefrom the Jusen" Problem, 29 LAw & POL'Y INTL Bus. 1, 19-20
(1997). Paraphrasing slightly, we described the norms in the following terms:
*
Survival of the Weakest. Policies (rates) are set to permit the survival of the weakest
member of the group. The weakest member of the group is often the one most
likely to defect from the group's norms because the benefit this member obtains
from abiding by those norms may be outweighed by the benefit it can obtain
through defection. Because defection by one member can threaten the entire
structure, the weakest member has a credible threat that places it in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis its counterparts. In consequence, the substantive norms
of the group are likely to protect the weakest member in order to insure this
member's continuing loyalty to the group.
The norm of Survival of the Weakest benefits the stronger as well as the weaker
members. In addition to enhancing the durability of the group as a whole, the
Survival of the Weakest norm may support pricing arrangements that allow the
weakest member to stay in business while allowing more efficient producers to
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bank failure in the postwar period.
B.

The Norm Against Hostile Takeovers

Closely linked to the main bank system is the second major distinguishing characteristic ofJapanese corporate governance, the absence
of a market for corporate control. Indeed, there have been virtually
no contested bids among Japanese firms in the postwar period. Hostile takeovers have thus played no disciplining role over Japanese
management. This function, to the extent it existed, was subsumed
within the operation of the main bank system itself. Failing firms were
often restructured under the guidance of the main bank, generally resulting in the replacement of existing management. Transfers of corporate assets are so heavily intermediated by banks that the tender offer process was used only three times from its inception in 1971
through 1990."-

earn supercompetitive profits.
No Exit (Ao Failure): Almost a corollary of the principle of Survival of the Weakest
is that of No Exit: no group member is allowed to exit (fail). This enhances stability both by preventing failure by weaker members and by increasing public confidence in the management of the group.
*
Responsibility and Equitable Subordination: When the danger of financial failure
grovs, the parent or principal source of funding for the failing entity is expected
to take responsibility by extending financial assistance and by subordinating its
claims to those of other creditors, even if not legally required to do so. This norm
encourages monitoring by stronger group members by imposing both monetary
and reputational costs on stronger players who allow smaller players under their
jurisdiction to fall into difficulty.
*
Implicit Government Insurance: The preceding norms lead naturally to a substantive
norm of implicit insurance provided by the government. If strong members are
expected to assist weaker members and if no member of the group is allowed to
fail, some entity must backstop the strong members. Thus, an implicit grant of
government insurance is inherent in the operation of the other norms. Put differently, the Responsibility and Equitable Subordination norm extends even to
the government.
There are a few examples of bank defection from these norms in the 1970s and
1980s. However, the most prominent of these, involving the bankruptcy of Sanko
Steanship Co. in 1985, actually underscores the existence of powerful nonlegal rules
in the banking industry. Sanko was forced to file for protection from its creditors in
1985 when its three principal lenders refused to extend additional financing to the
struggling firm. But prior to the banks' defection, both Sanko and the government
defected as well: Sanko resisted the banks' attempts to play a larger role in its management, and the government refused to provide explicit guarantees to the banks. See
JapaneseShipping Firm Sinks, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Aug. 14, 1985, available at 1985 WL
3576487; Masayoshi Kanabayashi, Japan'sSanko Faces Pressure To Seek Relief WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 13, 1985, available at 1985 WVL-WSJ 225942.
Hideki Kanda, Comparative Corporate Governance Country Report: Japan, in
"
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To be sure, there are legal and structural impediments to hostile
takeovers in Japan. The most formidable is the practice of stable
cross-shareholding among Japanese firms and banks, most prominently in the form of the keiretsu corporate groups. As Mark Ramseyer
has noted, while these obstacles do not prevent hostile takeovers, the),
do make them more expensive relative to the alternatives. 4 There
may also be a host of more subtle reasons for the lack of hostile takeover activity. For example, because a high percentage of directors of
public firms are alumni cohorts of a small number of prestigious universities, the managers of the erstwhile bidder and target could well be
classmates, particularly given the seniority-based promotion system of
most large firms."5
Interesting for our purposes, however, is the fact that these impediments are shrouded in a firmly established social norm. The
shared understanding that Japanese managers do not sell their companies, particularly to an uninvited bidder, is repeated like a mantra
in virtually every domestic and foreign commentary on Japanese
mergers and acquisitions ("M&A"). The following account of the
norm by a foreign observer is representative:
[T] he Japanese company is an extension of the concept of the family;
the company cannot be separated from the people who comprise it. The
sale of ajapanese business, therefore, is said to have the flavor of the sale
of people. It is said to be immoral. Even the Japanese vocabulary used
in acquisitions supports this view. The purchase of a company in Japan
is called "nottori," which can be translated as "a hijacking."
It is impossible to determine whether the structural impediments,
the subtle factors, the norm, or some combination of the above is actually doing the work of dampening the market for corporate control
in Japan. Nonetheless, the very existence of such a pervasive social

COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOvERNANCE:

THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING

RESEARCH 921, 934 (Klaus Hopt et al. eds., 1998).
14 J. Mark Ramseyer, Takeovers inJapan: Opportunism,Ideolog,
and CorporateControl,
35 UCLA L. REV. 1, 38 (1987). For an excellent overview of obstacles to mergers and
acquisitions ("M&A") in Japan, see Berkeley Scott, M&AJapan: An Updatefrom Morgan
Stanley, Bus. INSIGHT JAPAN, Nov. 1998, at http://bi-japan.com/1998/nov/bijapanwww/zashi/dm2.htm.
15This possibility emerged from a discussion with Robert Rasmussen. Indeed, just
under fifty percent of the presidents of firms having capital of at least YOO billion in
1995 were graduates of the University of Tokyo. Setsuo Miyazawa & Hiroshi Otsuka,
Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite inJapan, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'YJ. 1, 20
& tbl.25 (2000), availableat http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/1/02.html.
16 Kelly Charles Crabb, The Reality of Extralegal Barriersto Mergers and Acquisitions in
Japan, 21 INT'L LAW. 97, 116 (1987) (citations omitted).

20011

CREATIVE NORM DESTRUCTION

2091

understanding seems significant. Even if its effects are overwhelmed
by more prosaic disincentives to hostile bids, the emergence and persistence of a "trivial" social norm remains to be explained.
C. Beliefs About BoardStructure and Role
There is a sizeable gap between Japanese corporate law and practice on the composition and role of the board of directors. In contrast to the German system of codetermination,Japanese law does not
require employee participation at the board level. Yet Japanese
boards are comprised almost exclusively of managers who have served
the corporation throughout their career and are viewed as employee
representatives.17 Legally, the Japanese board is charged with monitoring corporate activity and vested wkith the authority to make important managerial decisions."l In fact, boards have not traditionally emphasized their monitoring role. Moreover, it is commonly understood
that a few senior directors (acting as an informal management committee) or a representative director (who is virtually always the president) have the ultimate decisionmaking authority in the corporation,
rather than the board as a whole. These discrepancies between law
and practice recently led a blue ribbon corporate governance panel to
conclude that "[i]t is questionable whether the Japanese board of directors actually complies with the Commercial Code's stipulation that
it function[] as the body 4which decides on corporate will and exercises corporate oversight."'
The gaps between law and practice can be traced to beliefs about
the board's proper function in the Japanese system. Election to the
board has traditionally been viewed almost exclusively as the crowning
achievement in a long career with the firm that begins upon graduation from college. As noted above, virtually all members of the board
have traditionally been members of senior management (typically one
from each of the company's major divisions).'° Indeed, the Commercial Code does not even recognize officers as a distinct corporate organ, suggesting that the concepts are indistinct. The fact that senior
managers are almost never hired away from competitors or firms in

1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMM., CORPORATE GOVERNANcE FORUM
OFJAPAN,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES-AJAPANESE VIEW 41-42 (1998).

SH6H [Commercial code], Law No. 48 of 1899, art. 260.
CORPORAkTE GOVERNANcE COMM., supra note 17, at 49.
Id.; set, also WILLIAM M. MERCER COMPANIES LLC, TORISHIMARIAKU
INoBEISHON [DIRECTOR INNOVATION] 49 (1999) [hereinafter DIRECTOR INNOVATION].
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other industries reinforces the perception that directors represent
employees or, at most, divisions of the firm.
This belief system shaped the two defining characteristics of the
traditional Japanese board, its large size and lack of independent directors and committees." A survey of all listed companies in Japan
found that the boards of firms with more than 1000 employees had an
average of 17.7 directors. Among the same firms, 22% had 20 to 24
directors and 10% had 25 or more directors. 2' The friendly merger of
two large Japanese banks once created a board of 67.23
The common practice of having a very large board composed almost exclusively of senior managers is consistent with the view of
board seats as incentive devices for loyal employees. The practice,
however, is harder to square with the legal conception of the board as
the locus of corporate monitoring and strategic decisionmaking. "4
D. Lifetime Employment
Another principal feature of Japanese corporate structure is the
"lifetime" employment system, which covers white-collar and most
blue-collar workers in large firms. In this system, the mutual expectation of employer and employee is that the employee will enjoy continuous employment until the mandatory retirement age. Wages that
undercompensate for productivity at the outset of the employment relationship are eventually offset by wages that overcompensate for productivity in the latter stages of the employee's career. Semi-annual
bonuses, an integral part of the salary structure, are loosely tied to
firm performance and pensions are generally not portable. Because
labor mobility is limited and the employee has in effect posted a bond
at the outset of the employment relationship that will only be fully recouped upon retirement, employees have a significant vested interest
21

See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMM., supra note 17, at 41-42 (noting the diffi-

culties of achieving board independence).

DIRECTOR INNOVATION, supra note 20, at 20-21. A study by Steven Kaplan found

thatJapanese firms had a median of 21 directors, while U.S. firms had a median of 15.
Steven N. Kaplan &J. Mark Ramseyer, Those JapaneseFirms with Their Disdainfor Shareholders: AnotherFableforthe Academy, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 410 (1996).
23 The Skies Are Darkeningover Japan'sBig Bank Mergers, ECONOMIST, May 27, 2000,
at 75.

24 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMM., supra note 17, at 49.

CalPERS believes the

Japanese view of the board as a status position bestowed upon long-term employees as
a reward for loyal service is in direct conflict with the monitoring and decisionmaking role of the board. CalPERS, Japan Market Principles, http://vAvw.calpersgovernance.org/principles/international/apan/page04.asp (1999).
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in the continued viability and success of their firms.
Lifetime employment is not legally mandated. Nonetheless, treating lifetime employment as a norm requires qualification, because law
has played an important role in shaping this institution. Japanese
courts have supported the lifetime employment system by supplying
bargaining endowments to both employers and employees, resulting
in malleable, long-term employment patterns.25 For employees, judicial precedent places substantial constraints on an employer's ability
to dismiss workers even where layoffs are motivated by economic necessity. For employers, doctrine supports adjustment of work rules
and ambiguous demarcation ofjob requirements, providing flexibility
in worker assignments and transfers. Thus, important aspects of lifetime employment are legally enforceable.
At the same time, however, it is unlikely that the threat of legal
sanction was the primary motivation ofJapanese firms in entering into
long-term, open-ended employment relationships with key workers.
While some cases on abusive dismissal predate the emergence of lifetime employment practices, the Supreme Court did not affirm the
standards developed in the lower courts until 1975. Furthermore,
many of the important cases restricting layoffs arose out of the oil crisis of the 1970s and the yen crisis of the 1980s, long after lifetime employment practices were firmly entrenched. More importantly, the
judicial standards for dismissal apply to a much larger universe of employees than those covered by lifetime employment,' 6 indicating that
implicit promises of career-long employment security are not the only
available response to the legal requirements.
Professors Ronald Gilson and Mark Roe hypothesize that lifetime
employment grew out of a political deal in which favored workers
were granted employment security in return for labor peace and cooperation. They characterize lifetime employment as "political" to
emphasize the noneconomic rationale driving the formation of the
institution. But their account is consistent with the view that lifetime
employment arose out of a larger social pact to bring stability to post-

For further analysis of the importance ofjudge-made law in the development of
Japanese employment practices, see Takashi Araki, Flexibility in JapaneseEmployment Relations and the Role of the Judiciary, in JAPANESE COMMERCIAL LAW IN AN ERA OF
INTERNATIONALIZATION 249 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1994).

Id. at 253-54.

RonaldJ. Gilson &MarkJ. Roe, Lifetime Employment: LaborPeace and the Evolution
ofJapanese CorporateGovernance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 522-23 (1999).
k7

2094

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW

[Vrol. 149:2083

warJapan. s Indeed, the origins of lifetime employment are echoed in
the judicial standards on abusive dismissal, under which layoffs must
be "objectively reasonable and socially appropriate." 9 Viewed in this
light, lifetime employment is a social norm that has been sanctioned
and diffused by the state. °

It is now common to analyze corporate governance institutions in
a given country as a system of complementary components, meaning
that the system as a whole is greater than the sum of the individual
parts." The nonlegal rules ofJapanese corporate governance, particularly in conjunction with cross-shareholding practices, clearly constitute a complementary system. Bank monitoring, for example, has
greater impact where share ownership is concentrated and lifetime
employment is the norm; it would have less effect where ownership is
dispersed, the market for corporate control is active, or senior managers are recruited from outside the firm. 3 A tradition of nonlegal
governance may itself be complementary to bank monitoring. It has
been argued that bank monitoring is actually enhanced by a low level
of legal enforcement, since it reduces liability disincentives to active
participation in the oversight of client firms.33 The absence of a hostile takeover market in a system of bank monitoring, in turn, makes
credible the implicit promise of lifetime employment, which reinforces beliefs about the proper role of management and the structure
of the board.
Less well understood, however, is a question the seminal literature
explicitly sidesteps: how are diverse actors led to pursue coherent
34
We
policies and practices that result in complementary systems?
28

In fact, Gilson and Roe expressly leave room for this interpretation. Id. at 523

(hypothesizing that the deal was "cemented by an emergent norm or 'macro' political
understanding").
29 Ichikawa v. Nihon Shokuen Seiz6 Co., 29 MINSHii 456, 458 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 25,
1975).
30 For a similar conclusion, see Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese LaborLaw: Activism in the Service of-Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635, 651 (1996).
31 The seminal article is Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Complementarities and SysEconomic Organization,9 EsTUDIos ECONOMICOS 3 (1994).
tems: UnderstandingJapanese
32 These examples come from Hideki Kanda, Japan'sFinancialBig Bang: Its Impact
on the Legal System and Corporate Governanc4 in CRISIS AND CHANGE IN THE JAPANESE
FINANCIAL SYsTEM 277, 281-82 (Takeo Hoshi & Hugh Patrick eds., 2000).
33 Id. at 284.
Milgrom & Roberts. supra note 31, at 19.
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turn now to this question. As we will see, in Japan individual governance components were bonded into a complementary whole by normative glue emerging out of the distinctive environment surrounding
World War II.
II. NORM CREATION AND THE DEMAND FOR CORPORATE LAW

Why did these corporate governance norms emerge and how did
they interact with the corporate law? Fortunately, it is possible to
identify the historical period in which all of the corporate norms just
discussed emerged. Knowing the historical context makes it possible
to develop a hypothesis about how the norms emerged and why they
persisted.
A. Originsand Persistenceof Normative CorporateGovernance
Tracing the origins of social norms is no small task, and I do not
claim to have definitive historical evidence linking the emergence of
normative corporate governance in Japan to the actions of individual
actors. Yet one thing is clear: although claims to the contrary are virtually ubiquitous, none of the norms just described is deeply rooted in
Japanese culture or reflects longstanding business customs.
On the contrary, the corporate governance norms surveyed above
are a postwarJapanese invention. Indeed, evidence of common prewar practices contrary to each of the four norms is not hard to find.
For example, the main bank system did not exist in the first major
phase of modernJapanese economic growth, the Meiji and Taisho periods (1868-1925), nor did any system of bank-oriented corporate governance.:'6 Crucially, the government's implicit insurance against
bank failure, which animates the main bank norms, was not in place

Strictly speaking, the institution that would become the postwar main bank system had its origins in iartime loan syndicates guided by the government. Juro Teranishi, Loan Syndication in IVar-TimeJapan and the Originsof the Main Bank System, in THE
B NK SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 51.
The governance of firms is not the only place where a bit of digging reveals the
shallowness of Japanese claims to deep historical roots. See MIRROR OF MODERNTY:
INVENTED TR1%DITIONS OF MODERNJAPAN (Stephen Vlastos ed., 1998) (finding recent
origins of many "age old"Japanese practices and cultural icons, including the rituals of
sumo Testling, aversion to litigation, and domesticity ideals).
",Yoshiro Miwa &J. Mark Ramseyer, Banks and Economic Growth: Implications
from Japanese History 33-35 (Aug. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Social

J,VPP EE SIN.U

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
available at
Network),
Research
Science
papers.cfmcfid=428604&cftoken=85393283&abstractid=239957.

2096

UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 149:2083

before World War II. At least in the 1920s and 1930s, the Japanese
government did not interfere with market discipline on banks, and
37
bank failures were numerous.
Mergers and acquisitions were also common in the Meiji Period.
The family-controlled conglomerates known as zaibatsu frequently
used acquisitions, including hostile takeover bids, as a strategic means
of entering and developing industries 8 Moreover, in the 1950s, several former zaibatsu firms were threatened by hostile bids. Managerial
fear of hostile bids may have been an impetus for the practice of crossshareholding, which emerged about this time.: 9
Finally, prewar practices at the board and employee levels also differed from the patterns previously discussed in this Article. For example, there is evidence that during the turn of the last century outside directors served on many boards and played an important role in
monitoring firms. 4 Perhaps most surprisingly, employment relations
through World War II are best described as insecure, as high rates of
turnover and a mutual lack of long-term commitment on the part of
employers and employees predominated.41 In short, prewar Japanese
corporate governance shared more traits with the present AngloAmerican system than with its postwar reincarnation.
Why did norms at odds with past practices emerge to create the
defining characteristics of postwar Japanese corporate governance?
37 NIHON GINKO [BANK OFJAPAN], SENZENKI NI OKERU HATAN GINKO
SEIRI NOJIREI

[EXAMPLES OF FAILED BANK RESOLUTIONS IN THE PREWAR PERIOD] (1998) (showing
major capital and deposit write-offs for failed banks during a financial crisis in the
1920s).
38 See TOMATSU & Co., YoKu WAKARU M&A [UNDERSTANDING M&A] 28
(2000);

Zenichi Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance:
Current Changes in Historical Perspective 2 (Nov. 4-5, 1999) (unpublished manu-

script, on file with author).
See Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, Japanese Corporate Governance and
Macroeconomic Problems 8-9 (Apr. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Social Science Research Network), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.taf?cfid=428604&cftoken=85393283&abstract id=235758.
40Yoshiro Miwa &J. Mark Ramseyer, The Value of Prominent Directors: Lessons
in Corporate Governance from Transitional Japan 6-7 (Nov. 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Social Science Research Network), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?cfid=428604&cftoken=85393283&abstractid
=192388.
41 See, e.g., ANDREW GORDON, THE EVOLUTION OF LABOR RELATIONS IN JAPAN:
HEAW INDUSTRY 1853-1955, at 132-61 (1985) (discussing pre-World War II trends in
employment relations and variations in commitment level); Gilson & Roe, supra note
27, at 518-20 ("Stable employment is not a continuous Japanese cultural tradition....
Yearly turnover rates of around seventy-five percent were the norm in most industries
during World War I."); Shishido, supra note 38, at 3.
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Part of the answer, as other scholars have recognized, is that World
War II created new patterns of interaction between government and
industry that left an indelible mark on Japan's economic structures. 2
The National General Mobilization Law, enacted in 1938, provides insight into how the exigencies of wartime production could have reoriented thinking about the organization of firms. 4 The purpose of the
law, which vested the government with vast power over all facets of labor, capital, contracting, and the operation of commercial enterprises, was "the control and operation of human and material resources in order that the nation may be enabled to display its total
power most effectively for the realization of national defense purposes
in time of war." " Main bank practices, for example, have been traced
to wartime financing directives issued by the Ministry of Finance to
the banking industry. And the impact of this regime appears to have
been even more pervasive than the banking and finance scholars have
indicated. A recentJapanese newspaper editorial suggests that the law
"cast a spell" over Japan, serving as both catalyst for the economic dy1990s.41
namism of the 1980s and albatross in the long recession of the
Important as these influences no doubt were, it is difficult to
credit wartime production alone with shaping the corporate governance norms of the next half century. After all, the National General
Mobilization Law was repealed fifty-five years ago. The Japan of the
1970s to 1990s bears little economic, political, or social resemblance
to the Japan of the 1930s and 1940s. Two central insights from standard norm scholarship help enrich the scanty existing account of the
emergence and persistence ofJapanese corporate norms. First, norms
can sometimes supply a governance framework at lower cost than
formal rules. Second, norms are subject to strategic manipulation, including manipulation by the state. In the remainder of this Part, I
draw on these insights to explain the rise and persistence of normative
corporate governance in postwarJapan.
One of norm scholarship's principal contributions to date lies in
showing that over a wide range of human activity, informal norms
provide more efficient mechanisms to govern conduct than legal
Q See, e.g., Teranishi, supra note 35, at 65-66, 75-80 (discussing the Japanese government's intervention into business during World War II and its effects on the postwar period).
0
Kokka s6d6inh6, Law No. 19 of 1938.
44

Id. art. 1.

45Nfitsuo Miura, Economic Forum: BreakingFree from Stranglehold of Wartime Regime,
YOMIURI SHIMBUN, May 3, 2000.
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rules.4 6 Applying this insight to Japan, it is highly plausible that in the
immediate postwar environment, nonlegal rules supplied a corporate
governance framework at lower cost than the legal system. To understand why, consider the extant legal system as it impacted corporate
conduct. Japan's Commercial Code, a late-nineteenth-century German transplant, was extensively amended in 1950 under the influence
of the occupation reformers to imbue the law with American notions
of shareholders' rights. Among other changes, the amended Code
enabled shareholders to access corporate records, bring derivative
suits, vote cumulatively, and receive share appraisals in mergers. In
short, minority investor legal protections were enhanced in precisely
the ways that modem reformers suggest is crucial for good corporate
governance in transition economies. 47 While the amendments eventually received support from the business community, academic and
practitioner commentary was initially highly critical of the drastic increases in shareholder rights,4 8 which co-existed awkwardly with the
Code's emphasis on creditor protections. A board of directors and
concepts of director accountability were also introduced into the
Code at this time. 9 Yet the new board of directors overlapped with
the Code's preexisting, German-style statutory auditor system, which
was also designed to monitor corporate compliance. Thus, from its
inception, the board was functionally orphaned by the statutory
scheme.
Japanese securities laws also had been recently transplanted from
abroad. The occupation reformers refused to reopen Japanese securities exchanges after the war until a statute resembling the U.S. securities laws was enacted. This was accomplished with the Securities Exchange Act of 1948, which is based heavily on the U.S. Securities Act
of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The statute emphasizes
investor protection and features a broad antifraud rule based directly
46

The comparative advantages of private versus public ordering are a mainstay of

the norm literature. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 2 (concluding that valuemaximizing norms, not law, are central to social order); Bernstein, supra note 2, at 157
(arguing that private dispute resolution in the diamond industry is superior to recourse to the legal system); Janet T. Landa, PersonalVersus Impersonal Trade: The Size of
Trading Groupsand ContractLaw, 4 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 15 (1984) (arguing that trade
grougs are a response to inefficient legal structures).
See infra Part IV.A.
4S Mark D. West, The Puzzling Divergenceof CorporateLaw: Evidence and Explanations
from Japan and the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?cfid=428604&cftoken=85393283&abstractid
=251028.
49

Id.
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on section 10 of the 1934 Act" An independent SEC-style agency was
established to enforce the securities laws.5' As with the corporate law,
however, the new securities laws rested uneasily with national sentiment and the creditor orientation of the corporate law. Important
features of the new securities law regime, including the SEC-style
agency, were either repealed as soon as the occupation ended or atrophied in the ensuing decades.
The bankruptcy regime-"a dislocated set of procedures that has
developed haphazardly according to historical circumstance" 2 -was
similarly not conducive to efficient utilization. Some parts of the corporate reorganization regime are influenced by German law and date
to the 1920s; other parts were added in the wake of the occupation
and are modeled on U.S. law. In general terms, the problem is that
some reorganization options differ little from a private workout (providing scant incentive to use the state's ground rules), while other options are so procedurally rigid as to be highly unattractive.
In view of the more recent transition economy experience, it is
not surprising that this legal regime was overridden by private ordering and thus had little impact on corporate practices. Indeed, it
would have been more surprising if Japan had somehow escaped the
"transplant effect"-the inability of countries to assimilate foreign laws
rapidly, particularly in the absence of smoothing agents such as a legal profession familiar with the new statutes.) The transplant effect
was all the more likely to occur in transitional Japan since enforcement of the rights and protections contemplated by the new statutes
depended upon a small, newly independent judiciary with limited enforcement powers and a procedural landscape devoid of enforcement
incentives for legal professionals.
In some areas, norms likely prevailed because state-set ground
rules for economic activity were inadequately specified-a situation
that persisted until very recently. The No Hostile Takeover norm pro)"On the origins of Japanese securities law, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, Managing the
Market: The Ministry of Financeand Securities Regulation inJapan, 30 STAN. J. INIT'L L. 423
(1994).
Id. at 432-33.
Stacey Steele, Evaluatingthe NewJapaneseCivil RehabilitationLaw, 2 AUSTRALIuANJ.
AsLN L. 53,56 (2000).
1- The transplant effect has most recently afflicted the transition economies
of
Eastern Europe. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the
Transplant Effect 4 (Nov. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Social
Science Research Network), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.taf?.cfid=
428604&cftoken=85393283&abstract id=183269.
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vides an informative example. Until 1990, there were no share ownership disclosure requirements under the securities laws. Thus, it was
possible for a raider or greenmailer to secretly amass shares of a public company and spring itself upon an unsuspecting management.
Procedural safeguards in tender offers as well as securities antifraud
rules remained underdeveloped through the 1980s. To this day, the
Commercial Code provides managers with little flexibility to craft defensive measures to fend off unsolicited bids. In such an environment, a social norm denigrating hostile takeovers as unethical could
operate as a low-cost substitute for an extensive system of formal
ground rules for M&A activity and as a complement to the structural
obstacle posed by cross-shareholding practices. Even if the norm is
superfluous in those roles, it may have emerged as a convenient and
self-serving shorthand for a complex institutional reality. Alternatively, it may persist largely as a historical vestige of an era (particularly
before the rise of cross-shareholding) when it did play a role in dampening takeover activity.
Standing alone, however, the explanation from transaction cost
economizing confronts both empirical and theoretical problems.
While the Japanese legal and economic environments have evolved
significantly since the occupation, the nonlegal rules emerging in the
immediate postwar period continued to pervade the corporate governance regime. Most acutely, explanations from efficiency alone fail
to account for the past decade, in which Japanese firms and banks adhering to the norms have lost international competitiveness (see Table 1). Theoretically problematic is the assumption that dispersed actors sustained, for many decades, a high degree of coordination in the
face of a collective action problem. While it is collectively rational for
each of the players ofJapanese corporate governance to continue adhering to the norms if the per-firm benefit to the economy of private
ordering exceeds the per-firm cost, it is individually rational for each
firm to defect from those norms where the gains from launching a
hostile takeover or failing to rescue a troubled borrower, for example,
exceed the firm-specific benefits of norm compliance. This analysis
suggests that normative corporate governance would not be a stable
equilibrium unless (1) the postwar norms were immediately and universally internalized, (2) a coordination mechanism exists, or (3)
there are substantial private benefits to norm compliance.
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Table 1: Japan's World Competitiveness Ranking 1986-20005'

1986-1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

1
3
4
4
9
18
16
17

Thus, in order for our explanation to be complete, we need an
account not only of the creation of the norms, but also of their persistence despite changes in the transaction cost environment and evidence of their eventual inefficiency. I discount the rapid internalization of the new norms as an explanation because no convincing
theory exists to explain such a phenomenon. Rather, two causes of
inefficient norm persistence seem particularly relevant to our account.2 First, information lags bedevil the efforts of any group to
maintain efficient norms in the face of changing environments and
technologies. Even if old norms are gradually replaced, the inefficient
norm governs during the transition period. As Table 1 suggests, the
deterioration in Japanese productivity was precipitous. Perhaps not
surprisingly, early signs of inefficiencies in normative corporate governance were dismissed as aberrational and the system veered perilously close to collapse before norm reform began in earnest.
Second and perhaps more importantly, norms may be created and
maintained for the private benefits they provide to favored groups.
The circumstantial evidence of norm capture in Japan is compelling.
World War II and its aftermath destroyed many organized interest
groups in Japan. " Several groups, however, including the bureaucracy

INT'L INST. FOR MGMT. DEv., WORLD COMPETrIIENESS REPORT (various years);
INT'L INST. FOR MGMT. DEv., WORLD COMPETITIVENESS YEARBOOK (various years). In

citing these rankings, I am conscious of the criticism directed at the notion of "world"
or "international competitiveness." See, e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN, POP INTERNATIONALISM
10 (1996) (suggesting that the term is misleading and simply another way of saying
"productivity"). Even if the term is open to criticism, the rankings are illustrative of
the deterioration in Japan's productivity vis-A-vis that of other countries.
71See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
1697, 1711-19 (1996) (discussing information lags and strategic behavior as causes of
inefficient norms).
5 MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 75-76
(1982).

2102

UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 149:2083

(particularly the Ministry of Finance), leaders of major commercial
banks, and corporate managers of the former zaibatsu, not only survived the occupation intact, but by design or serendipity actually enjoyed enhanced power as a result of the political and economic
purges.5' Whatever initial comparative advantage norms may have enjoyed over legal rules in postwar Japan, the norms ofJapanese corporate governance also clearly benefited the interest groups left standing
after the occupation. As Mark Ramseyer has argued, a no-takeover
ideology benefits managers of large corporations both by insuring
them against economic losses in a takeover and byjustifying managerial power."s The norm on board role and structure, with its selfserving emphasis on employee loyalty and the exclusion of outsiders,
performs a similar role. The main bank system allowed large banks to
extract rents from their borrowers." Financial regulators, in turn,
benefited from enhanced discretion and public prestige accruing to
the managers of a highly informal financial system that avoided bank
failure. More tangibly, they also derived rents from banks in the form
of a highly institutionalized system of lucrative post-retirement employment opportunities with regulated firms.
Normative corporate governance can thus be viewed as a largely
self-enforcing, informal response to the postwar legal environment.
Crucially, because powerful governmental actors also derived private
benefits from norm compliance, there was a built-in coordination
mechanism to overcome the collective action problem. The norms
were relatively impervious to change, despite their eventual inefficiency for society as a whole, because they continued to generate significant private benefits to powerful groups.

57 The

occupation authorities chose to rule through the bureaucracy, in particular
the Ministry of Finance, insulating it from major reform. The economic purge of 1artime executives and breakup of powerful "city" banks closely allied with zaibatsu were
either abandoned or diluted as reverse-course policies gained ascendance in the years
following Japan's surrender. JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE
WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 532-33, 544-45 (1999). Ironically, the dissolution of the zaibatsu actually reinforced the rights of corporate insiders by creating the ideal conditions for a pure internal promotion system insulated from both family succession problems and outside directors. Fabrizio Barca et al., Post-War Institutions: The
Divergence of Italian and Japanese Corporate Governance Models 23-24 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
58Ramseyer, supra note 14, at 12-13.
19David E. Weinstein & Yishay Yafeh, On the Costs of a Bank-Centered FinancialSystem: Evidencefrom the ChangingMain Bank Relationsin Japan,53J. FIN. 635, 639 (1998).

20011

CREA TIVE NORM DESTRUCTION

2103

B. The Interactionof CorporateNorms and Law
Not suprisingly, heavy reliance on nonlegal rules reduced demand
for corporate law and legal professionals in postwarJapan. The main
bank system redirected some of the most complex corporate reorganizations away from the legal system, replacing the judge and courtappointed receiver in a formal bankruptcy proceeding. 60 The main
bank system also provided a substitute for the accountants and credit
rating agencies who specialize in corporate monitoring and disclosure
for the benefit of corporate claimants in more capital-market-driven
financial systems.
Similarly, private ordering provided substitutes for legal procedures designed to protect shareholder rights. The concentration of
large blocks of stock in the hands of banks and other institutional investors and the organization of many firms into keiretsu corporate
groups with a main bank at the center provided mechanisms of voice
and access to information for many Japanese institutional shareholders that were less costly and more effective than Commercial Code
mechanisms. This was particularly true because, until recently, procedural requirements made shareholder derivative litigation very
costly. ",
Norms were also used to bypass roadblocks in the legal system for
investor protection. As noted above,Japanese securities law contains a
broad antifraud provision facially similar to Rule lOb-5. , 2 Yet, in contrast to the situation in the United States, the Japanese provision is the
basis of no private securities fraud litigation (and virtually no public
enforcement either, at least until very recently). The ostensible legal
reason is prosaic: the antifraud provision does not expressly contemplate suits by private claimants, and Japanese courts do not recognize
implied private rights of action. The normative response was creative:
instead of suing, aggrieved investors relied on an informal norm in
To be sure, rapid economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s kept the number of
corporate reorganizations low in any event.
Japanese law contains a shareholder derivative suit mechanism, which
was
adopted in 1950 and is similar to that found in U.S. state corporate codes. Shareholders who satisfy minimal standing requirements can bring suit against directors for
breach of duty. Yet until recently, this mechanism was virtually moribund in Japan.
Derivative suits were rare because enforcement problems raised the cost of the procedure relative to private alternatives. Until a statutory amendment in 1993, most Japanese courts held that the amount of the filing fee required to initiate such a suit
should be tied to the amount in controversy. This posed a formidable barrier to litigation, since the damages sought in derivative suits are often substantial.
._ Supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
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the securities industry under which large brokers implicitly indemnified important customers for investment losses." In order to seek redress for losses in securities transactions, investors began turning to
the courts in large numbers (claiming breach of contract or tortious
injury) only after this practice was prohibited in the early 1990s.
Table 2 provides data on the demand for law in the governance of
Japanese firms. While the measurement is imperfect, Table 2 highlights the traditional infrequency of direct resort to the standard legal
mechanisms for resolving disputes and organizing relations among
shareholders, managers, and creditors. It is of course both possible
and likely that the legal regime nonetheless affected private ordering.
It also bears noting that resort to these mechanisms is becoming more
routine, a development that is explored in the next part of the Article.
Table 2: Demand for Corporate Law"
Number of Tender Offers for Public Companies
1971-1999
Number of Shareholder Derivative Suits Filed 1950-1990
Number of Private Securities Fraud Cases Brought
Under the Securities Exchange Law 1950-2000
Average Annual Number of Criminal Cases Brought Under the Securities Exchange Law 1989-1998
Percentage of Corporate Insolvencies Resolved
Through the Legal System 1980-1990

51
23
0
3
10

The process of Commercial Code reform in Japan also indicates
an historically sluggish demand for corporate law. Traditionally, most
corporate law reforms were not the result of competitive or even interest group pressures, as private actors sought a more efficient or privately beneficial formal governance framework. Rather, changes were
prompted by one of two impulses. Some were theoretically appealing

63
64

Milhaupt, supranote 50, at 460.
Data on tender offers are from Keisho Komoto, The Present Status of Takeover Bids

(TOB) and Their Effect on Stock Prices, 147 NLI RESEARCH 8 (2000), and Kanda, supra
note 13, at 934; data on shareholder derivative suits are from 196 BESSATSU SHOJI
H6MU 475-82 (1997); data on securities fraud cases by regulators are calculated from
SHIH6 TOKE NEMPO [ANNUAL OFJUDICIAL STATISTICS] (various years); data on insolvencies are calculated from Frank Packer & Marc Ryser, The Governance of Failure:
An Anatomy of Corporate Bankruptcy in Japan 57 tbl.1 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia University School of Business, Center on Japanese
Economics and Business).
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revisions made by the scholars and Justice Ministry officials in charge
of Commercial Code reform ("theory pushed" rather than "demand
pulled" reforms in the words of one scholar"); others were responses
to exogenous shocks such as political scandals." For this reason,
throughout postwar Commercial Code history, many legal reforms
have had little or no effect on Japanese corporate practices.6 7 Only
the small number of recent demand-pulled reforms discussed in Part
III of this Article have led to significant changes in practice.
At least partly as a result of the substitution effect between private
and public ordering, as Table 3 indicates, Japan has the smallest formal legal system of any major industrialized country. Table 3 must be
interpreted with considerable care, because it understates the size of
the Japanese lawyer population in failing to include significant numbers of quasi-legal professionals and an even larger number of lawtrained public and private sector employees who perform lawyer-like
tasks. Notwithstanding this caveat, however, Japan has only about
1000 corporate and securities lawyers as those terms would be understood in the United States. The Japanese legal system is small even in
comparison to the German and French legal systems, which served as
models for Japan during its first modem phase of legal transplanting.
Particularly noteworthy is the small number ofjudges in Japan.

Shishido, supra note 38, at 9.
West, supra note 48.
Shishido, supra note 38.
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'
Table 3: International Comparison of Judicial Systems (1997)'
U.S.
Legal Pro- 940,508
fession
Per 100,000 352.5
Population
Lawyers
906,611
Per 100,000 339.87
Population
Judges
30,888
Per 100,000
11.6
Population

England

Germany

France

Japan

82,653

111,315

35,695

19,733

158.3

135.7

61.3

15.7

80,868
154.89

85,105
103.77

29,395
50.15

16,368
13.0

3170
6.07

20,999
25.6

4900
8.4

2093
1.7

C. Evaluation
The process I have described is a mutually reinforcing cycle. The
formal institutional environment is problematic, leading those with
the most at stake to generate alternative practices. Powerful interest
groups (including some state actors) select norms consistent with
their own self-interest. A process of what might be called "social codification" occurs as the favored groups become contented with the informal institutions and memories of inconsistent practices fade. Pervasive resort to norms reduces demand for law and legal reform. Lack
of competition from the legal system, in turn, contributes to the durability of the norms.
While the norm literature recognizes complementarities between
public and private ordering, scholars have focused attention almost
exclusively on the "expressive function" of law. Similarly, it is now well
understood that the state can draw in more private enforcement of a
norm by enacting it into law.69 Indeed, we saw an example of this in
lifetime employment, where the courts confirmed and diffused a social norm in favor of employment security.7° But Japan's experience
demonstrates that the state also reinforces norms by simply falling to
Saikb Saibansho [Supreme Court of Japan], 21-Seiki no shih5 seido wo kangaeru
[On the Legal System of the 21st Century] tbl.16 (2000), http://www.courts.go.jp/

pre2l/16.gif.

69See Robert D. Cooter. Law from Order: Economic Development and theJurisprudence
of Social Norms, in A NOT-So-DIsMAL SCIENcE 242 (Mancur Olson & Satu Khk6nen

eds., 2000) (stating that the backing of state officials increases the effectiveness of private enforcement and lowers its costs).
70 See supra Part I.D.
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mobilize its lawmaking power against them. To be sure, the state actively promoted normative governance by directly supporting the payoffs from norm compliance and by occasionally serving as enforcer of
ostensibly private commitments. The operation of the main bank system is perhaps the best example of the government's overt role in
norm enforcement.
More subtly, however, the state exercised its monopoly
power over
• • 71
the legal system to raise the cost of norm deviation. For example,
the Lifetime Employment norm may have been •less
stable if the gov72
eminent had not strictly regulated headhuntng. The No Hostile
Takeover norm and belief system about corporate boards were buttressed by low-quality corporate and financial disclosure. 73 More firms

may have used the tender offer process for both friendly and hostile
deals in a more robust environment for financial disclosure, since lack
of information is a serious obstacle to corporate acquisitions. Similarly, boards of directors may have become more attuned to monitoring and shareholder accountability under a more stringent disclosure
regime, particularly if costly procedural barriers to derivative litigation
had been removed more promptly. As the next section of the Article
shows, these norms began breaking down rapidly once their inefficiency was publicly revealed.
The Japanese experience also casts light on a mainstay of the
norms literature: the debate over the comparative advantages of public versus private ordering. The question is whether norms or law
should be preferred as a tool of social governance. Jonathan Macey,
for example, has asserted a categorical public-choice-based preference
for private ordering, on the ground that legal rules exist where norms
This inertial approach to norm reinforcement is particularly effective in systems
like Japan's that adhere to a norm of regulatory prohibition. This is a shared social
understanding among regulated groups that conduct not explicitly approved by law is
prohibited. Hideki Kanda, Politics, Formalism, and the Elusive Goal of Investor Protection:
Rgilation of Strutured Investment Funds in Japan, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 569, 582
(1991). While adherence to the norm lowers the cost of lawmaking, it also greatly reduces priate innovation around inefficient rules-and inefficient norms to the extent
they would othermise be eroded by new law--or channels that innovation into corruption or organized criminal activity. See CurtisJ. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side
of Private Ord, ing: An Institutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 41, 43 (2000) (arguing that organized crime is "the dark side of private ordering-an entrepreneurial response to inefficiencies in the property rights and enforcemnt framnework supplied by the state").
Gilson & Roe, supra note 27, at 527-28.
Ser Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
7

MICH. L. RE-v. 338, 392 (1997) (noting that "law can manipulate norms by manipulating information").
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alone would be suitable because organized groups demand laws from
politicians. 74 Other scholars have voiced suspicion that norms will
usually not be fully efficient, because they arise in situations that depart from the classic model of perfect competition."' In the Japanese
case, norms did provide a comparatively efficient governance structure when the legal framework for corporate conduct was unfamiliar,
incomplete, and weakly supported with enforcement incentives. But
Japan's experience suggests that the converse of Macey's claim can
also be true: norms may persist where legal rules would be more efficient due to the same capture phenomenon that is well understood in
the regulatory context.
One of the reasons Japan's ongoing recession has been so prolonged and severe is that norms had to be undermined before elements of the legal framework critical to recovery could be erected.
This was most apparent in banking, where a legal structure for handling bank failures had to be built virtually from scratch before any
progress could be made toward resolving the nonperforming loan
problem. Before the political process could be engaged to create
such a structure, however, the underlying social norms that aggrandized the No Failure principle for banks (and thus precluded the operation of market forces in the banking industry) had to be undermined.76
III. CREATIVE NORM DESTRUCTION
Despite their tenacity, the postwar norms of Japanese corporate
governance are being destroyed by a confluence of forces., Norm reform is taking place for the reasons predicted in the models developed by norm scholars: 77 exogenous shocks are altering cost-benefit
conditions and group membership, increased information is giving

74 Jonathan R Macey, Public and Private Orderingand the Production ofLegitimate
and

IlegitimateLegal Rules, 82 CORNELLL. REv. 1123, 1124 (1997).
Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1749
(1996). Katz is careful to add, however, that because state-set norms may suffer from

the same limitations, a priori there is no basis for preferring public or private lawmaking. 76 See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Japan'sExperience

with Deposit Insuranceand FailingBanks:

ImplicationsforFinancialRegulatoryDesign?, 17 MONETARY & ECON. STUD. 21, 23 (1999)
[hereinafter Milhaupt, Deposit Insurance].
77 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective
from the
Legal Academy 7 (July 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Social Science Research
Network),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?cfid=
428604&cftoken=85393283&abstractid=191392.
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rise to norm shopping, agents specially suited to lead the process of
norm change are emerging, and state actors are engaging in norm
manipulation. I take up the process of norm reform for each of the
nonlegal rules examined above.
A. Main Bank Norms
The norms supporting the operation of the main bank system
have been under stress for most of the past decade. A complete appreciation of their gradual demise would require recounting the bubble economy, the ensuing banking crisis, and the tortured efforts to
build a viable financial regulatory structure in Japan, a task that I will
not undertake here. 78 Instead, I wish to highlight three developments
that are destroying the main bank norms as traditionally understood:
(1) a change in the economics of the operation of these norms, (2) a
shift in belief systems about bank governance and corporate governance, and (3) a quirky exogenous shock that delivered a blow to the
norms at the heart of the main bank system.
The first step in the destruction process is a dramatic change in
the payoff structure to banks that abide by the main bank norms. For
most of the postwar period, there was a compelling economic logic to
the main bank system. Banks delegated monitoring and restructuring
responsibilities for a given firm to its main bank, which possessed superior information about the firm's operations and prospects. As
noted above, main banks were willing to perform this role at least in
part because they extracted rents from their borrowers.) In turn, the
importance of the main bank institution to the economy insulated
banks from failure and ensured a steady stream of regulatory rents,
which provided incentive to continue behaving as a "good" main
bank."
This logic began to unravel, however, when the moral hazard implicit in the main bank norms peaked in the bubble period of the
1980s, resulting in a massive nonperforming loan problem. By the
mid-1990s, the international financial community began to perceive
an unusual form of systemic risk arising from the norm-supplied safety
net. While not expressed precisely in these terms, the market worried

For analysis, see Milhaupt, Deposit Insuranc supra note 76; Milhaupt & Miller,
supra note 12.
Weinstein & Yafeh, supra note 59, at 639.
Takeo Hoshi & Hugh Patrick, TheJapaneseFinancialSystem: An Introductory Overview, in CRISIS AND CI-LANGE IN THEJAPANESE FINANCIAL SiSTEM, supra note 32, at 1, 7.
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that regulators would undermine the strength of major Japanese
banks by enforcing the Equitable Subordination norm-that is, pressuring the banks to bear more than their pro rata share of losses in
connection with the collapse of weak institutions to which they had
lent heavily-and by enforcing the No Failure norm by orchestrating
acquisitions of institutions that should have been allowed to fail. The
price exacted for these concerns was labeled the 'Japan Premium," an
additional risk premium charged by non-Japanese banks on loans to
Japanese banks in international money markets. At one time the Japan Premium exceeded 100 basis points (one percent), a large premium given the razor thin margins in this area of finance. Crucially,
until a majorJapanese bank was allowed to fail in late 1997, the same
premium was charged to allJapanese banks regardless of individual
financial strength, a clear indication that the premium reflected systemic risk arising from the implicit regulatory scheme.8'
The second step in the destruction of the main bank norms is a
significant shift in beliefs about the benefits of bank-oriented corporate finance and governance. Not long ago, Japan was a model for
developing economies in Asia and Eastern Europe. In contrast to the
United States, Japan had not politically hamstrung large financial intermediaries from playing a role in corporate governance. Banks
solved agency and information problems inherent in stock market
driven systems, led to far-sighted alliances between capital and production, and served as pliant partners of government in carrying out
industrial policy (or so the argument went). But in the wake of the
Asian financial crisis and Japan's long recession, "relationship financing" became "crony capitalism." Easy credit policies inherent in bankoriented systems are now linked with monitoring lapses and poor corporate performance.
The third and perhaps most interesting step in the destruction of
main bank norms is the nationalization and reprivatization of the
Long-Term Credit Bank ("LTCB"), one of postwarJapan's largest and
most politically connected banks. LTCB, which served as the main
bank for many important firms, became insolvent and was temporarily
nationalized in 1998. It was later sold to Ripplewood, a group of foreign investors including Citigroup and GE Capital, when no Japanese
81Milhaupt, Deposit Insurance,supra note 76; Milhaupt & Miller, supra note 12.
82 See, e.g., Anderson & Campbell, supra note 8, at 1 (finding
that ineffective governance exacerbated the Japanese banking crisis and delayed restructuring); Randall
Morck & Masao Nakamura, Banks and Corporate Control inJapan, 54J. FIN. 319, 319-20
(1999) (reassessing the efficacy ofJapanese bank governance of firms).
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buyer for the bank could be found. The acquisition agreement gave
Ripplewood the option to return to the government any assets (loans)
that decline from March 1, 2000 book value by twenty percent or
more uithin three years. The put option is lost, however, if the bank
(renamed Shinsei Bank) accepts a borrower's request for loan forgiveness.
Whether intended by the government or not, by altering the
bank's incentive structure in this way, the Shinsei deal threatens the
bank's nonlegal commitment to failing borrowers. Since loan forgiveness is a central feature of the main bank system as traditionally
understood, the agreement undermines a crucial informal rule in
Japanese finance. Indeed, in several recent cases, including the high
profile bankruptcy of Sogo Department Store, Shinsei refused requests to write off loans to failing borrowers, leaving the firms no
choice but to resort to legal protection under the bankruptcy regime. ' This prompted ajapanese newspaper to grouse that the bank
had "ignored traditional Japanese thinking by rejecting a plan to forgive Sogo's debts."" As a result, Shinsei's status as a main bank, and
the continued viability of the norm-based main bank institution itself,
are in question. Standard & Poor's, for example, recently noted "increasing uncertainties over the system of credit support for major
Japanese companies, which many Japanese borrowers and lenders had
taken for granted." "' The report concludes that "It] he long-held perception.., that major Japanese companies are too big to fail is no
longer valid." 7

Rt1born LTCB Has a Western Look, NIKKEI WKLY., June 12, 2000,
available at
http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp.
1 Analysis: Sogo's Collapse May BringAbout New FinancialOrder,YOMIURI
SHIMBUN,
July 19, 2000.
Analvsi : Shinsei Bank Carries a Heat " Burden of LTCB Legacy, YOMIURI SHIMBUN,
June 7, 2000 (quoting one bank executive as stating, "[i]t has become difficult to see
Shinsei Bank pla)ing the role of a main bank"). Some in the industry suggest that if
Shinsei is unuilling to forgive debts, it ill be excluded from the Japanese banking
community and ill need to rely on foreign capital. Id. This refers to the fact that
LTCB did not rely on deposits for capital, but instead raised funds by issuing debentures tojapanese institutional investors.
11Jitendra Joshi, Dangers Grow for Japan Inc. 's Credit Quality: Standard and
Poor's,
AGENCE FRvNCE-PRESSE, July 18, 2000.
,7Gillian Tett, Japanese Haunted by Turmoil of '98, FIN. TIMES, July
20, 2000, at 25,

available at http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?id=000720000260
&quer) =gillian+tett. Shinsei is not the only bank playing by new rules. Other major
Japanese banks refused to extend debt forgiveness programs to a real estate group,
which %vasforced to file for liquidation.
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The No Hostile Takeover Norm

Looking back, scholars may date the beginning of the end of the
No Hostile Takeover norm to January 24, 2000. On that date, ajapanese firm called M&A Consulting, Inc. ("MAC") launched a hostile
tender offer for Shoei Corporation, a member of the Fuyo keiretsu.
This was one of the first postwar hostile takeover bids for a Japanese
corporation by ajapanese corporation.
The bid was motivated by a desire to destroy the No Hostile Takeover norm.8 This is evident from the nature of the offer itself and
from MAC's own public pronouncements. For example, although the
market price of Shoei shares quickly reached and then surpassed the
offering price of Y1000 per share (a fourteen percent premium over
Shoei's closing price on the day prior to the offer), MAC steadfastly
refused to raise its bid. Even in the midst of the offering period, the
bidder's CEO publicly admitted that he never expected to win a controlling stake in Shoei because Fuyo group companies owned approximately sixty percent of its shares and were unlikely to tender
them in the bid. 9
MAC's own publicity materials emphasize its norm reform mission. The materials stress that the firm is "[nlot bound by conventional ideas and practices." 9 They describe MAC as "an active market
player that is making its mark on corporate Japan."' The company
professes a "Firm Belief in the Market Economy" and
views "M&A as
'
one of the powerful tools for dynamic restructuring. ,192
What makes the bid even more interesting is the man behind it.
The CEO of MAC is Yoshiaki Murakami, formerly a senior official at
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI"), traditionally one of the most elite positions in Japanese society. Murakami is a
textbook example of what Robert Ellickson calls a change agent.
Change agents are low-cost suppliers of new norms because they pos-

At least this was the primary purpose of the bid as represented to me by one of
the principals. Interview transcript I (Tokyo,June 27, 2000). This is not to say that the
motives of the bidder were purely altruistic. Indeed, as explained below, the bidder
had reason to expect both tangible and intangible benefits from a breakdown in the
norm. See infra text accompanying notes 94-98.
89Peter Landers, FirstJapanese To Seek Hostile Takeover Expects To Fall Short,
Seek
BoardSeat WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2000, at A12.
90 Introduction to M&A Consulting (June 2000) (unpublished
materials, on file

with author).
91
92

Id.
Id.
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sess attributes such as technical knowledge and leadership skills that
reduce the opportunity costs of norm reform. Moreover, change
agents can anticipate both tangible and intangible benefits from the
acceptance of the new norm. More specifically, Murakami displays
both of the traits Ellickson identifies with the "norm entrepreneur," a
subspecies of change agent. First, Murakami "possess [es] a relatively
high level of technical knowledge relevant to the norms within his
specialty." '-i At MITI, Murakami spent much of his career on industrial policy, corporate governance, and M&A issues. He was thus intimately familiar with the legal and social institutions surrounding
Japanese M&A. Second, he "is likely to be cognizant that there are
appreciative experts (often, close associates in a social subgroup) who
are likely immediately to esteem the norm entrepreneur for trying to
change the social practice at issue. 9 4 Murakami's efforts were generally applauded in the Japanese and foreign financial press,9' the legal
and investment banking communities, and by his former colleagues
at MITI, where corporate governance reform is now a major preoccupation.' 7 Whether Murakami anticipated such widespread applause is
unknowable. Yet Murakami has long-standing political ambitions,"
and at the very least he may have anticipated a major boost in name
recognition as a result of his norm reform effort. More tangibly, he
saw a business opportunity as a consultant in a robust market for corporate control.
The bid was financed by Orix Corporation, a leasing and financial
senices company that is viewed in Japan as a corporate nonconformist.' The CEO of Orix, Yoshihiko Miyauchi, played a supporting role
Ellickson, supra note 77, at 19.
Id.
See, e.g., Nihon sho "Tettaiteki baishl", [The Meaning ofJapan'sFirst "HostileAcquisition " NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Jan. 27, 2000, at 3 ("Although it is a mini-deal by world
standards, [MAC's bid for Shoei] is a fitting way to begin the year 2000 for Japan, a
runner that is being lapped in the race among capitalist countries."); Peter Landers, A
Hostile Takeover Bid Elbows Its Way into Usually PoliteJapan,WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2000, at
A13 ("[T]he struggle for Shoei could become a milestone in Japanese corporate his'

tory.").
Interview Transcript B (Tokyo, June 20, 2000); Interview Transcript H (Tokyo,
June 27, 2000); Interview Transcript K (Tokyo, June 27, 2000). Most lawyers and investment bankers did see shortcomings in the Shoei bid as a precedent, however, given
its small size and failure to attract keiretsu shareholders.
,7 Interview Transcript M (Tokyo,June 28, 2000).
Interview Transcript I, supranote 88.
Phred Dvorak, Japan's Orix Burnishes Its Reputation as Maverick ly BankrollingHos-

tile Bid, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 27, 2000, at A16 ("Orix group ... is known for playing outside
the rules that traditionally governed corporations.").
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in the cast of norm entrepreneurs. He is described by the Wall Street
Journalas "a well-known advocate of shareholder rights and deregulation."' ° One Japanese banker, reflecting on Orix's support for Japan's most highly publicized hostile bid, commented, "That's the type
of thing Orix would do. Big Japanese banks wouldn't dare-they
worry too much about what others would think." 101
As expected, the bid failed when the Fuyo group companies refused to tender their shares. Ultimately, MAC increased its stake in
Shoei by just a few percent. But this did not stop Murakami from
claiming victory. On this point, he may have been correct. By many
accounts, this small, quixotic, and unsuccessful bid helped tenderize
the market for corporate control in Japan. 2
C. Board Role andStructure
Professor Melvin Eisenberg has written perceptively about the
normative underpinnings of the increased level of directorial care in
the United States over the past decade. Eisenberg argues that because
neither an increase in the threat of liability nor the prospect of gain
can account for this change, the increased level of care must be due to
a shift in social norms about the board's obligations." 3 Ultimately, he
traces this norm shift to a change in the belief system of the business
community about the board's duty of care, functions, and structure.
Corporate governance has changed over the past twenty years as the
dominant conception of the board moved from a managerial model
to a monitoring model.1 0 In Eisenberg's view, this change in belief
system was due to new information about managerial efficiency that
was transmitted by takeover premiums. The legal system reinforced
the shift, as a series of Delaware cases created a new image of the
board's proper role in corporate governance.105
The process that Professor Eisenberg describes for American
boards has parallels in many recent developments in Japan. A significant shift in mindset-or at least rhetoric-among boards of major
Japanese corporations is apparent, with the managerial model being

100Landers, supra note 95.
101Phred Dvorak, Orix Takes a Maverick Stance in Japan, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 27,
2000, at 1 (internal quotation omitted).
102 See Interview Transcript K, supra note 96; Interview
Transcript M, supra note 97.
103Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1266-71.
104 Id. at 1278-82.
105Id. at 1269-71, 1278-82.
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replaced by the monitoring model. Consistent with Eisenberg's analysis of the U.S. situation, the threat of liability or prospect of gain is not
sufficient to account for the heightened concern for corporate performance among Japanese managers. Until a major decision involving the directors of Daiwa Bank was rendered in the fall of 2000, the
only cases in which directors of public companies had ever been
found liable to their shareholders for breach of the duty of care involved unambiguous violations of domestic law, such as violations of
the Commercial Code."" The Daiwa Bank case itself, which involves a
Caremark-like failure-to-monitor claim, represents egregious directorial
nonfeasance regarding violations of foreign (U.S.) law." Thus, for all
but a tiny fraction ofJapanese directors, the threat of personal liability
is small. Nor is increased income from enhanced performance likely
to be the principal motivation for the change in mindset. Stock price,
while a factor in executive compensation in Japan, does not have the
high-powered incentive effects on management that it does in the
United States because stock options are a very recent and limited
component of executive compensation. Rather, Japan's waning international competitiveness and the stream of negative publicity surrounding managerial performance in the bubble period appear to
have motivated the shift in beliefs about the directors' role.
While the threat of liability alone may not have been a rational
reason to reshape the board's structure and function, the Japanese
courts are helping to catalyze the change in directorial mindset. In
the process of deciding a rash of shareholder derivative litigation that
broke out when procedural barriers were removed in 1993, the courts
are educating directors about the scope and content of their obligations. These cases have focused a spotlight on board conduct and, for
the first time, put some interpretive flesh on the Commercial Code's
skeletal description of directorial duties to the corporation.
The Daiwa Bank case is perhaps the best example of this process.
Shareholders of Daiwa Bank derivatively sued eleven current and former directors for failing to uncover and report to U.S. authorities
massive unauthorized trading in the New York branch that resulted in
almost $1.5 billion in losses and fines. When eleven years of unauthorized trades were finally revealed by the rogue trader's confession,
b",HIDEKI KUBORI ET AL., TORISHIMARIYAKU NO SEKININ: DIHY
RISU'KU KANRI

[THE LIABILrIES OF DIRECTORS:

SOSHOJIDAI NO

RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE AGE OF

SLREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION] 102 (1999).
,7 Nishimura v.Abekawa (The Daiwa Bank Case), 199 SHIRYOBAIN SHOJI HOMU 248
(D. Ct., Sept. 20, 2000).
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senior bank management reported the problem to Japan's Ministry of
Finance. The Ministry suggested that disclosure to the Federal Reserve, which had jurisdiction over the branch, be delayed to avoid instability in the Japanese financial system. Acting at the Ministry's suggestion, Daiwa filed a misleading Call Report with the U.S. banking
regulators. When the Federal Reserve eventually discovered the problem, it fined the bank $340 million and revoked the bank's license to
operate in the United States. The Osaka District Court found the directors liable for breach of duty, and ordered them to pay about $775
million in damages. In a passage that nicely illustrates the tension between old and new rules governing Japanese managers, the court
found that "the defendant [directors] had persisted in following informal local rules that only apply in Japan, despite the fact that [the
firm's operations] had expanded on a global scale."'0 8
As educators of management, the Japanese courts are performing
a modest version of the role Professor Edward Rock described for the
Delaware courts. °9 While the Japanese case law does not explicitly
reference Delaware jurisprudence, it is hard to imagine that the courts
(and by extension boards of directors) are not influenced by it. Virtually every scholarly analysis of the Japanese board's role in corporate
governance now refers to landmark Delaware cases such as Van
Gorkom,n ° Unocal, and Caremark."
Again, as in the United States, the takeover market (albeit a diluted version thereof) played a role in delivering the bad news about
managerial inefficiency to Japanese boards. Leading business journals
and even a research committee working under the auspices of MITI
have recently published lists of companies that, by various measures,
are attractive acquisition targets.1 13 As the MITI research committee's
108Id. at 255.
109 See Rock, supra note 1, at 1016 ("[T]he Delaware courts generate in the first
instance the legal standards of conduct... largely through what can best be thought of
as 'corporate law sermons.'... Taken as a whole, the Delaware opinions can be under-

stood as providing a set of parables. . .
110 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
11 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
112 In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); see, e.g.,
Seiichi Okazaki, M&A no kosh6 to torishimariyakuno keiei handan [M&A Negotiations and
Directors'BusinessJudgment],1562 SH6JI H6MU 18 (2000) (Part I), 1563 SH6JI H6MU 27
(Part II), and 1566 SHOJI HOMU 22 (Part III).
11 See, e.g., MBO KENKRY
KAI [MBO RESEARcH GROUP], WAGA KUNI NI OKERU
MBO DONYU1 NO IGI TO SONO FUKYU NI MUKETE NO KADAI [THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
INTRODUCTION OF MBOS INTO OUR COUNTRY AND IssuEs RELATED TO THEIR
DIFFUSION] 3, 4 (1999) [hereinafter MBO RESEARCH GROUP] (listing attractive targets
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report notes:
Among Japanese firms, many have balance sheets loaded with nonperforming assets.... There are 33 publicly traded firms [identified by
name in the report] in which net cash balances exceed market capitalization. In an age in which efficiency is given higher priority than expansion, managers must bear fundamental responsibility for such inefficient
utilization of assets.""

This report represents perhaps the most blatant of several recent attempts at norm manipulation by state actors.
Unlike the situation in the United States, however, the evolution
of Japanese norms on board role and structure can also be traced to
the work of an identifiable norm entrepreneur. In 1997, Sony undertook significant board reform, shrinking the size of its board from
thirty-eight to ten (seven executive and three outside directors) and

introducing the executive officer [shikk6 yakuin] structure, which has
no legal foundation under the Japanese Commercial Code. The
seven executive directors and twenty-seven presidents of the various
Sony companies comprise the executive officers."' Sony's reform,
which was widely reported in the business and legal press, appears to
have been a tipping point in board belief systems. Orix and other major firms quickly followed Sony's extra-legal innovation. Within one
year of Sony's move, over 100 firms had adopted similar reforms.
200.'17
Within two years, the number of adopting firms approached
This extralegal arrangement does have a significant legal advantage for the firms adopting it. Because the Japanese Commercial
Code does not recognize officers as a corporate organ, only directors
(and statutory auditors) are liable to the corporation for breaches of
duty. Thus, Sony-style board reform not only facilitates board monitoring and strategic decision making, it also reduces the available tar-

based on Net Cash to Market Capitalization Ratio and Takeover Recovery Cost Ratio);
Masatoshi Kikuchi, TOB sanyasui kig5' 25 sha [25 Firmsfor Wich a Tender Offer Could
Easily Be Made], EKONOMISUTO, Mar. 14, 2000, at 60, 61 (listing attractive targets based
on asset xalues and other factors).
114MBO RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 113, at 3.
" TETSUO NrWA, SHIKKO YAKUIN SEI [THE ExEcuTrIvE OFFICER SYSTEM] 18 (2000).
DIRECTOR INNOVATION, supra note 20, at 20-21. This marked Sony's second
pioneering departure from the regulatory prohibition norm. In 1995, it bypassed legal
obstacles to the issuance of stock options through creative use of bonds with detachable %arrants.
D7 Shikk5 yakuin donyi! kasoku [Acceleration of Adoption of Executive Officer System],
NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, June 25, 1999, at 3 (indicating that 179 companies adopted
the )stem).
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gets of shareholder derivative litigation.""
D. Lifetime Employment
Lifetime employment remains the stickiest of all the corporate
governance norms. On one hand are data portending an eventual
decline in this institution. A Labor Ministry survey indicates that
many major firms plan to eliminate jobs, and the rate of soon-to-be
college graduates who have yet to find employment is at a record
high, indicating that firms have cut intake into the lifetime employment system." 9 Moreover, the market appears to be rewarding firms
that depart from the norm, and punishing those that continue to
12
There have been several large layoffs recently, including
abide by it.
20,000 at NTT, 21,000 at Nissan, and 17,000 at Sony. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that younger workers place higher value on meritbased pay and promotions over long-term job security.
Yet adherence to the job security norm is dying hard, despite
widespread acknowledgment of serious over-employment in the ranks
of middle management. As one Japanese newspaper recently put it
(complete with misrepresentation of history), "Most Japanese companies intend to maintain the lifetime employment system, despite growing criticism that the centuries-old practice is destroying the economy. '' 12' The large layoffs to date have mostly involved firms already at
the fringes ofJapanese corporate norm compliance, such as Sony and
Nissan, which is now controlled by Renault. A recent survey indicates
118Indeed, popular "how to" books on the officer system aimed at white-collar

workers tout this legal advantage. See MANABU HAYASHIDA & MAMORU NANAMURA,
JINZAI KATSUYO BIGU BAN

[THE BIG BANG IN UTILIZING HUMAN RESOURCES]

138

(2000). If these board reforms were motivated solely by the fear of liability, see Mark D.
West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan 11 (Nov. 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Social Science Research Network), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?cfid=428604&cftoken=85393283&abstractid
=251012, they would appear to be an overreaction to the legal environment. It is also
possible that the executive officer system merely ratifies existing practice, in which actual decisionmaking authority is vested not in the whole board, but in a small subset of
the most senior board members.
19 Shuichi
Ito, The Changing Corporate Climate in Japan, J. JAPANESE TRADE &
INDUSTRY, Mar. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 19832771.
120 There are several reports of abnormal returns on the
stock of firms that announce layoffs. See Kishiko Hisada et al., Japan Sticks to Lifetime Job System, tks 'HI
SHIMBUN, Dec. 2, 1999, at 4, availableat 1999 WL 17701748 (reporting that one corporation's stock price more than doubled after it announced layoff plans); Shishido, sapra note 38, at 7. Moody's Investor Service lowered the ratings of companies that insupra,at 4.
tend to maintain lifetime employment. Hisada et al.,
121 Hisada et al., supra note 120, at 1.
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that a majority of companies plan to maintain the lifetime employment system; most are seeking to reduce employment through natural
or incentivized attrition.1 22 Finally, a comprehensive study of survey
results and qualitative data has found little support for the rhetorical
claim that lifetime employment practices are coming to an end. 2 3
IV. NORmS IN COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW SCHOLARSHIP
As noted in the Introduction, norms have been largely ignored in
the comparative corporate governance debates of the past decade.
Perhaps this was understandable in the first phase of such scholarship,
which was preoccupied with exposing the political leitmotif of a given
country's financial laws and resulting corporate structures. Grappling
ith norms seems inevitable, however, now that scholarly attention
has turned toward two interrelated questions: whether law matters to
corporate ownership and finance around the world and whether corporate governance systems are converging, particularly toward an Anglo-American, shareholder-centered model. In this Part, I draw on
Japan's experience with norms and corporate governance to inform
analysis of these questions.
A. (Non)Law Matters
Comparative corporate law scholarship appears to have entered a
new era. Politics is out; law is in. For a decade, the literature was
dominated by a search for the effects of politics on corporate governance structures. Large financial intermediaries and concentrated
shareholdings were viewed as attractive (or at least equally compelling) alternatives to stock markets and dispersed ownership, since political contingencies, not economic rationale, were deemed to be determinative of corporate finance, structure, and monitoring. Now a
provocative new line of empirical scholarship has emerged to challenge this view. This literature, which is dominated by economists,
holds that variations in law and its enforcement are key to understanding why corporate ownership and finance differ across countries." ' A

Id. at 3.
See Takao Kato, The End of "Lifetime Employanent" in Japan?: Evidence from
National Surveys and Field Research (Jan. 31, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
1- For a review of this literature by its principal proponents, see Rafael La Porta et
al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance (2000) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with Social Science Research Network), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
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series of studies shows that the origin of a given country's legal system
and the quality of its law enforcement are statistically correlated with
patterns of share ownership, the cost of capital, and other corporate
governance variables. In contrast to the political approach, this scholarship suggests that dispersed ownership is a sign of good legal protection of minority investors. Because common law systems apparently
outperform civil law regimes on investor protection, more robust capital markets and more dispersed ownership exist in countries adhering
to the common law tradition.25
Few legal academics would dispute the assertion that corporate,
securities, and bankruptcy law matter to corporate governance, and
the statistical significance of the results in these studies must be taken
seriously. Yet the empirical results are more puzzling than the authors
of these studies admit and the implications for reform more attenuated than a naive reading of the literature would suggest. Here I wish
to highlight several problems and limitations inherent in the new "law
matters" literature by bringing norms, particularly Japan's experience
with norms and corporate governance, into focus.
First, the statistical correlation between formal legal protections
and corporate governance patterns revealed by these studies is in tension with the results of important natural experiments in transition
economies, including Japan's. In a recent paper, the authors of the
seminal "law matters" literature imply that the occupation legal reforms had a significant impact on Japanese corporate governance.""
As we have seen, however, enhanced investor protections in the corporate and securities laws of precisely the type recommended in the
new literature had virtually no impact on Japanese corporate practices
or shareholding patterns for several decades. Share ownership was
widely dispersed in the immediate postwar period, but this was the direct result of the forced dissolution of the zaibatsu, a key occupation
policy. In fact, as Table 4 shows, the decades following the occupation-imposed improvements in formal legal protection of minority investors in Japan are characterized by a steady concentration of share
ownership in the hands of large financial and corporate investors.
This is not surprising, given the complementarities between concentrated share ownership, particularly by financial institutions, and the

sol3/papers.cfm?cfid=408152&cftoken=41757136&abstract id=183908.
See id. at 29 ("[SJ trong investor protection is associated with effective corporate
governance, as reflected in valuable and broad financial markets, dispersed ownership
of shares, and efficient allocation of capital across firms.").
126 Id. at 25.
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operation of nonlegal rules on takeovers, main bank operations,
board structure, and employment. Unsurprising, perhaps, but in direct tension with the thrust of the "law matters" literature. Significant
changes in share ownership patterns became evident only recently, coinciding with the breakdown of normative corporate governance and
the formation of coalitions to lobby for reform of corporate law.'27
Table 4: Share Ownership of Japanese Public
Companies (Selected Shareholders)"2
Year
1949
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

Foreigners
Financial In- Corporations Individuals
(Corp. & Indiv.)
stitutions
69.1%
5.6%
9.9%
61.3%
11.0%
12.6%
1.7%
53.2%
23.6%
13.2%
1.3%
17.8%
46.3%
30.6%
1.8%
44.8%
29.0%
18.4%
3.2%
39.9%
32.3%
23.1%
2.6%
33.5%
36.0%
26.3%
4.0%
29.2%
38.8%
26.0%
5.7%
25.5%
24.1%
42.2%
4.2%
23.1%
45.2%
25.2%
9.4%
23.6%
23.6%
41.4%
23.6%
9.8%
23.8%
41.3%
9.8%
24.6%
24.1%
40.2%
25.4%
10.0%
24.1%
39.3%
12.4%
26.4%
23.7%
36.1%

Second, norm analysis exposes theoretical weaknesses in the speci-

On
JL,7

the relationship between coalitions and corporate law reform, see John C.

Coffee,Jr., Convergence and Its Critics: What are the Preconditions to the Separation
of Ownership and Control? (Sept. 12, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Social Science Research Network), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/

papers.cfm?cfid=428604&cftoken=85393283&abstract_id=241782.

One good example

is the re-establishment of an independent securities regulator in Japan. As noted

above, the occupation reformers created an SEC-style agency, but it was viewed as irrelevant and disbanded as soon as they left. It took forty years for it to be reestablished, after a series of scandals in the 1980s and 1990s created widespread dissatisfaction with the largely informal and nontransparent regulation of the Ministry of

Finance.

'2 Zenkoku shaken torihiki ky6gikai [Securities Exchange
Council of Japan], Heisei 11 nendo kabushiki bunpujo5k)8 ch~sa kekka ni tsuite [On the Results of the 1999 Suraey of
Slare Distribution],at 10, Graph I-3,June 26, 2000.
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fication of the model underlying the "law matters" literature. In the
model, ownership concentration, external finance, or some other
corporate governance variable is regressed on a set of variables designed to control for the quality of legal protection afforded investors,
including both shareholders and creditors. Some variables measure
substantive shareholder protections, with a focus on voting rights in
the election of directors and other important corporate matters.
Others quantify substantive creditor rights in liquidation and reorganization procedures when borrowers default. The model also includes summary variables such as survey-based estimates of the "rule of
law" and the "efficiency of the judicial system," which are designed to
control for the quality of law enforcement. While the model has produced statistically significant correlations between the legal variables
and the corporate governance variables, it is not clear what is being
measured. The extent to which legal rules are enforced is not necessarily a function of the "quality" of a legal system or the "efficiency" of
the judiciary, even assuming those attributes can be quantified. We
have seen that on the level of positive law, several areas of Japanese
corporate and securities regulation are virtually identical to the
American provisions on which they were based, yet levels of enforcement of these provisions differ dramatically between the two countries
for reasons that are unlikely to be captured in the standard indices.
Moreover, while it is firmly established that social norms can substitute
for law on the level of substance, remedies, and enforcement, the
model does not-and probably cannot-control for these substitution
effects. In short, the "law matters" model is operationalized in a manner that is inconsistent with legal theory and historical experience.
So then, what to make of the results? Perhaps, as the authors
themselves suggest, the legal variables are simply a proxy for climates
that are hostile or friendly toward institutional development. '1' Indeed, it would be interesting to investigate further the correlation between legal regimes and normative environments. Some preliminary
work along these lines has been done,'O but the field is wide open for
inquiry.
Third, the empiricists may have reversed the actual chain of causa-

129Rafael La Porta et al., Legal DeterminantsofExternal Finance,52J. FIN. 1131, 1149
(1997).

I See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Trust in Large Organizations,87 A6M. ECON. REV.,

PAPERS AND PROCS. OF THE HUNDRED AND NINTH ANN. MEETING OF THE AM. ECoN.
ASS'N, May 1997, at 333 (finding that countries with more dominant hierarchical relig-

ions have, among other things, less efficient judiciaries and more corruption).
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tion between law and corporate governance. Law and its enforcement
may not determine the structure of corporate groups; rather, important corporate and financial groups in a given society may drive the
development of legal institutions and enforcement practices by affecting the demand for law, at least in part through norm creation and
destruction.'3 ' This, at least, is what I have argued above with respect
to Japan. Another salient example of this phenomenon is the prevalence of concentrated share ownership throughout East Asia. In many
of these countries, family control and succession is a socially valued
practice that has persisted through innumerable changes in legal regime. It takes a legal centrist in the extreme to believe that the South
Korean chaebol, for example, could be disbanded (or never would have
emerged) if the corporate code simply contained provisions on cumulative voting, preemptive rights, and the other minority protections
emphasized in the empirical literature. Where powerful enterprise
groups already exist, they constitute major antagonists against the
adoption and enforcement of laws that alter the balance of power between controlling and minority shareholders. At the very least, the
Japanese example indicates that significant time lags-half a century
in Japan's case-may be present between legal reforms and corporate
governance effects.
This causation analysis provides broader perspective on Professor
John Coffee's argument that legal developments tend to lag behind
economic change."' Sometimes, as Coffee argues, legal developments
must await the formation of motivated coalitions to lobby for new protections. Probably more often, however, motivated coalitions block or
dilute legal developments adverse to their narrow interests. At other
times, particularly when law is shaped by foreign advisors or occupying
) l The authors of the empirical studies seek to rebut this criticism by claiming

that legal origin is exogenous and pointing out that the legal origin variable remains
significant even when holding other variables constant. It is unlikely that a legal system
is completely exogenous, however, even where a colonizing or occupying force has imposed it. More importantly, the validity of the classification scheme used to create the
legal origin variable is highly suspect. For example, these studies listJapan as belonging to the German civil law family. This is partially, but only partially, true ofJapan's
five major codes, which were adopted around the turn of the last century. But many
subsequent Commercial Code revisions and important economic regulatory statutes
are of U.S. origin. German law has had only a minor influence on postwar Japanese
legal developments. Thus, the classification forJapan is only partially accurate and no
theory is offered to explain why legal origin, as opposed to subsequent legal developments, would be determinative of corporate governance patterns. It would not be surprising if the classifications of legal origin for other countries in the study were subject
to similar defects.
1,, Coffee, supra note 127, at 9.
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forces, legal developments outpace the absorptive capacities of society.
Fourth, the policy implications of these studies are open to multiple interpretations. As other commentators have pointed out, it may
be overly optimistic to interpret these studies as suggesting that countries simply need to improve their corporate law (that is, to enact the
list of investor protections that correlate empirically with desirable resuits) in order to improve corporate governance. A less sanguine view
is that legal rules are highly complementary within a given legal system, so that legal improvements require reforms of entire legal systems. 133 Norm analysis, and the Japanese experience with norms in
particular, suggests an even more pessimistic interpretation: the
complementarities at work in corporate structure and finance go well
beyond the components of the formal legal system, encompassing social norms and their enforcement. The good news here is that norms
are subject to change; the bad news is that the process may be even
more difficult and unpredictable than reforming entire legal systems.
In the Japanese case, we have seen that corporate norms may be the
product of interest group dynamics and that their informal character
can subject the process of reform to the happenstance of exogenous
shocks and the appearance of norm reformers. If, as seems most
plausible, differences in corporate finance and governance are due to
institutional (and not exclusively legal) differences, including the
constraints people carry in their own heads, a vast amount of social
engineering remains even after legislators and courts begin to function. Japan's ongoing struggle to reform its corporate governance
and financial system indicates the importance and difficulty of changing mindsets, not just legal rules.
Although nothing in the postwar Japanese experience refutes the
empirical finding that law matters to corporate governance and finance, the Japanese case seriously challenges researchers and policymakers to refine their understanding of this relationship. For example, Japan shows that substitutes to legal institutions can operate
effectively and at low cost, at least in certain environments. Thus,
questions such as how nonlegally enforceable constraints emerge and
persist, whether they are efficient in comparison to available alternatives, and the policy implications of norm-based governance deserve
Erik Bergl6f & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for Transition and Developing Countries 5 (June 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Social Science Research Network), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/so3/papers.cfm?cfid=428604&cftoken=85393283
&abstractid=183708.
133
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increased scholarly attention. Norm analysis suggests the need to reconceptualize the linkage between the "rule of law" and economic
structures to accommodate more than the simple focus on formal
rules enforced by courts that dominates the early phases of the new
comparative corporate governance literature.
B. Normative Convergence
One of the few exceptions to the absence of norms from the comparative corporate governance literature is a recent article by Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman entitled The End of Histo0 for CorporateLaw.M Despite the title, Hansmann and Kraakman
seem principally concerned not with law, but with ideology. Indeed,
they assert that corporate law had largely converged worldwide by the
end of the nineteenth century.' 37 Yet basic legal convergence clearly
did not dictate twentieth-century global consensus on the appropriate
structure, financing, or conduct of corporate affairs. Thus, the central
claims of the paper relate to corporate norms-which for Hansmann
and Kraakman means ideologies about how firms ought to be runand their impact on corporate practices. They argue:
[A]t the beginning of the twenty-first century we are witnessing rapid
convergence on the standard shareholder-oriented model as a normative
view of corporate structure and governance. We should also expect this
normative convergence to produce substantial convergence in the practices of corporate governance and in corporate law.
These are bold claims, the accuracy of which has crucial implications for corporate actors and scholars everywhere. It is fair to ask
whether the two claims in this passage accurately describe developments in Japan, the world's second largest economy and longstanding
model of bank-centered corporate governance. Is Japan rapidly embracing a shareholder-centered ideology? Part III of this Article suggests that the answer is both yes and no. Certainly there are signs of
important norm shifts under way in Japanese business and government: increased acceptance of the takeover as a legitimate tool of
corporate strategy and monitoring (and a concomitant reduction of
legal and structural impediments to M&A), a heightened awareness of

shareholders' economic expectations, a change in managerial mindset
11 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of Historyfor CorporateLaw, 89
GEO.L.J. 439 (2001).
h'
Id. at 439.
, Id. at 443.
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about its proper role in running the firm, diminished social expectations of forbearance on the part of banks and their regulators, and rising ambivalence about the benefits of seniority-based employment
practices. These shifts are palpable and important. Taken together
with the emerging evidence of parallel norm shifts under way in
Europe, they portend a much narrower ideological spectrum on how
and for whose benefit firms should be managed.
At the same time, the rapidity and extent of Japanese normative
convergence toward the Anglo-American model should not be overstated. While signs of norm shifts are very recent, evidence of the inefficiency of the old norm structure surfaced nearly a decade ago.
And signs of norm stickiness are abundant. To take just one example,
the U.K. telecommunications firm Cable & Wireless, which recently
made a contested bid for a Japanese firm, interviewed seventeen Japanese law firms, including several with which it had ongoing professional relationships, before it found a single one willing to represent it
Similar reputational concerns serve as a
in connection with its bid.
continuing constraint on domestic financing for hostile bidders./
Complete analysis of Hansmann and Kraakman's first claim would
require a deeper inquiry into the process of norm change than is possible here. But three cautionary notes suggest that it may be premature to consign alternate corporate governance models (all of which,
ultimately, rest on a thick bed of nonlegal practices and customs) to
the dustbin of history. First, the informality of norms can frustrate
their reform because there is no established procedure for norm
amendment.1 39 Whether existing norms in a given system are malleable or rigid turns on the magnitude of private benefits they generate
and the willingness of state actors to participate in the norm manipulation process. Second, like law, norms are deeply intertwined with
special interests. A priori, there is no basis for concluding that norm
reform is more impervious to the effects of capture than its legal
counterpart. Thus, there is no reason to believe that corporate governance norms around the world are poised to yield uniformly to a
more efficient set of norms. Third, it seems unlikely that countries
can embrace the shareholder supremacy norm for corporate activity
137 Interview Transcript N (Tokyo,June 29, 2000).
138 Interview Transcript A (Tokyo, June 19, 2000); Interview Transcript J (Tokyo,
June 27, 2000).
139 Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Ap-

proach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1655 (1996) (discussing H.L.

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961)).
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without wholesale revision of deeply entrenched views and practices in
other areas of society.
Turn now to the linkage between normative convergence and
convergence of corporate law and practices. Japan provides modest
support for the claim that normative convergence is leading to
changes in corporate governance practices. At the margins, for example, norm shifts are influencing the selection of governance technologies. One example is increased interest in the management buyout as an acquisition technique. Perceived consistency between the
MBO and past Japanese business practices is often stressed, even by
the government, as a reason why this technique may be appropriate
for Japan."" The MBO is attractive because it has the potential to
meld two conflicting Japanese norms: the emergent concept of
shareholder primacy and the more longstanding focus on employee
welfare. To date, however, while MBO funding is available, few deals
have emerged because the technique has not caught on withJapanese
managers.
Yet normative convergence does not necessarily imply that formal
convergence will follow inexorably. Sometimes normative convergence outpaces legal reform and must coexist at least temporarily with
conflicting institutions. Japanese board reform is a good example of
this phenomenon. While Sony-style board reform was driven in part
by normative convergence, it has not yet led to changes in corporate
law. There is no legal recognition of executive officers as a corporate
organ, and thus executive officers are not legally accountable to
shareholders."' Nor for that matter has normative convergence in
this area led to complete functional convergence. Japanese directors
and officers still play different roles than their U.S. counterparts.
What seems more probable than a tight correlation between normative and formal convergence is a regime of constrained pluralism
among national corporate governance practices. That is, for all but
the most international of firms, practices will continue to diverge,
based as they are on a welter of different informal understandings and
1" MBO RESEARCH GRouP, supra note 113, at 7 (1999)

(emphasizing that the
MBO may be comparatively easy to introduce into Japan because, in contrast to other
forms of M&A, (1) it is similar to an existing Japanese business practice known as noronwake and (2) it generally does not entail mass layoffs).
M Interview Transcript K, supra note 96.

Proposals to amend the Commercial Code to legally recognize executive officers and subject them to derivative suits are pending, however. Shikk5 yakuin ni mo
hWteki sekinin [Legal Liabilityfor Executive Officers Too], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Dec. 5,
2010, at 1.
'"
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exogenous stimuli. But those practices will operate within a spectrum
of acceptable corporate governance goals and beneficiaries made narrower by general consensus on major issues such as the need to prevent expropriation of minority investments and the responsibility of
management to explain its decisions to shareholders.
At a fairly high level of generality, then, Professors Hansmann and
Kraakman have provided a provocative account of one of the principal mechanisms driving corporate convergence: the ascendance of
the shareholder primacy nonn. In so doing, they have highlighted an
understudied aspect of comparative corporate governance.
Ultimately, however, their claims may be overstated, deflecting attention
from what promises to be the key challenge for many transition countries, including Japan, in the decade ahead-the struggle to realign
the formal and informal components of their corporate governance
institutions into a complementary whole. As the experience of Japan
and other transition economies over the past decade suggests, this
process will be complicated by the extraordinarily unpredictable process of changing institutions by changing the way people think. For
the economic and political actors in these countries, it is not the end
of history, but the beginning of time.
CONCLUSION

Nonlegal rules and their relationship to formal institutions are
important to our understanding of Japanese corporate governance.
Inquiry into the origins of prevailing corporate norms reveals that,
contrary to common assertions, none enjoy a long history of practice
injapan. Rather, these norms appear to have emerged in response to
the peculiarities of the formal postwar institutional environment.
Norms provided a low-cost substitute for legal governance mechanisms in the institutional turmoil of the immediate postwar period,
when Japan was beset by the transplant effect that so commonly disrupts legal reform in transitional societies. The norms arising at that
time had particular resiliency because they supplied private benefits to
interest gr6ups left intact after the war, including key governmental
actors.
Today, the norms of postwar Japanese corporate governance are
being destroyed-some dramatically, others more gradually-by a
confluence of forces captured in the academic models of norm reform: increased information, exogenous shocks, the workings of
norm entrepreneurs, and state-led norm manipulation.
Examination of the postwarJapanese experience with norms and
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corporate law highlights the absence of norm analysis in comparative
corporate law scholarship. Bringing norms into focus contributes to
the debates on convergence and corporate law enforcement that
dominate the literature today and highlights several weaknesses in existing analyses of these issues.
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